1)Questions on Brunei
a) Why it declares the state of emergency?
In 1962, the first election in Brunei were held. The opposition party by the name Party Rakyat Brunei entered and won the election. This party, an opposition party opposed the idea to emerge Brunei with Malaysia as a one nation (During that time, Malaysia wanted to formed one federal state which consist Malaysia, Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei and Singapore). The reason why the opposition against this idea is because they are nationalists whom loved and cared so much not only to their beloved country but they also wanted to implement a full democratic rights for the masses.
Later on, the Monarchy banned them from entering the office although the opposition party has already won the election and as a result, the opposition party launch a full scale attack to the Monarchy by making a revolt and demonstration. But the Monarhcy with the help of the British gurkha crush the revolt and the Party Rakyat Brunei demands were totally rejected.
The Sultan declared state of emergency, suspended the constitution and banned the opposition party from entering the election or politics. This is the first and only election that Brunei had until now.
b) Before becoming a sovereign state in 1984, what was the status of Brunei?
Post Second World War, we witnessed that Brunei still continued its relationship with the British. Brunei continued to be British protectorate, in which the Sultan will have a British Resident as his advisor on how to take a good care of the country. The British also set up a Gurkha military force to protect Brunei state from internal and external enemies.
Although the protectorate arrangements were changed during 1971, the British still maintains its power by controlling and influencing the foreign policy/affairs and defence of Brunei and all the costs have to be bear by the Sultan.
After that, on 1984, Brunei gained its independence.
2)Questions on Cambodia
a) Name the Treaty that Cambodia sign in France in 1863.
The Protectorate Treaty.
b) Write 1 page report on Khmer Rouge.
Khmer Rouge, name given to native Cambodian Communists. Khmer Rouge soldiers, aided by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops, began a large-scale insurgency against government forces in 1970, quickly gaining control over more than two thirds of the country. The strength of the Khmer Rouge rose dramatically from around 3,000 in 1970 to more than 30,000 in 1973, enabling most of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops to withdraw. In 1975 the movement, led by Pol Pot, overthrew the Cambodian government, establishing “Democratic Kampuchea.” The new government carried out a radical program of evacuating cities, closing schools and factories, and herding the population into collective farms. Intellectuals and skilled workers were assassinated, and a total of perhaps as many as 1.5 million died, inclusive of starvation and forced marches. In 1979, after increasing tensions with Vietnam, Vietnamese troops invaded, aiding a rival Communist faction to depose the Khmer Rouge government. The Khmer Rouge, however, continued to field an army of 30,000 near the Thai border and retained UN recognition as the official Cambodian government. In 1982 it formed a coalition with former premier Norodom Sihanouk and non-Communist leader Son Sann. Khieu Samphan officially succeeded Pol Pot as head of the Khmer Rouge in 1985, but Pol Pot was believed to remain the real leader. All Cambodian factions signed (1991) a treaty calling for UN-supervised elections and disarming 70% of all forces. In 1992 the United Nations assumed the government's administrative functions, while the Khmer Rouge withdrew from the peace process and resumed fighting. The following year the Khmer Rouge rejected the results of the UN-run elections that brought a coalition government to Cambodia. The guerrilla force lost about half to three quarters of its strength (3,000–4,000 soldiers) in a mass defection in 1996. Factional fighting within the Khmer Rouge in 1997 led to Pol Pot's ouster, trial, and imprisonment by the Khmer Rouge. The group continued to disintegrate, and factional fighting resumed in 1998. Pol Pot died in April, Khieu Samphan surrendered in Dec., 1998, and by 1999 most members had defected, surrendered, or been captured. A tribunal consisting of both Cambodian and international judges was established in 2006 to try former Khmer Rouge leaders, but the question of trial procedures and other issues delayed the filing of any charges.
3)Questions on Indonesia
a) Explain the policies of guided democracy and Orde Baru.
i) Guided Democracy.
Against this background, Sukarno, resentful of his circumscribed position as figurehead president, began to move toward a greater interference with constitutional processes. In February 1957 he announced his own “Concept” for Indonesia. Criticizing Western liberal democracy as unsuited to Indonesian circumstances, he called for a political system of “democracy with guidance” based on indigenous procedures. The Indonesian way of deciding important questions, he argued, was by way of prolonged deliberation (musyawarah) designed to achieve a consensus (mufakat); this was the procedure at the village level, and it should be the model for the nation. He proposed a government based on the four main parties plus a national council representing not merely political parties but functional groups—workers, peasants, intelligentsia, national entrepreneurs, religious organizations, armed services, youth organizations, women's organizations, etc.—in which, under presidential guidance, a national consensus could express itself.
ii) Orde Baru or New Order.
Like Sukarno's Guided Democracy, the New Order under Suharto was authoritarian. There was no return to the relatively unfettered party politics of the 1950-57 period. In the decades after 1966, Suharto's regime evolved into a steeply hierarchical affair, characterized by tight centralized control and long-term personal rule. At the top of the hierarchy was Suharto himself, making important policy decisions and carefully balancing competing interests in a society that was, despite strong centralized rule, still extremely diverse. Arrayed below him was a bureaucratic state in which ABRI played the central role. Formally, the armed forces' place in society was defined in terms of the concept of dwifungsi. Unlike other regimes in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand or Burma, where military regimes promised an eventual (if long-postponed) transition to civilian rule, the military's dual political-social function was considered to be a permanent feature of Indonesian nationhood. Its personnel played a pivotal role not only in the highest ranks of the government and civil service but also on the regional and local levels, where they limited the power of civilian officials. The armed forces also played a disproportionate role in the national economy through militarymanaged enterprises or those with substantial military interests.
b) What does VOC stands for?
VOC can be defined as Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Dutch Hindian Company)
4)Question on Laos
a) Explain in 1/2 page report on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and Pathet Laos.
i) Ho Chi Minh Trail.
The Ho Chi Minh trail was a logistical system that ran from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) through the neighboring kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia. The system provided support, in the form of manpower and materiel, to the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF or Viet Cong) and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) during the Vietnam War (1960-1975).
The trail was not a single route, but rather a complex maze of truck routes, paths for foot and bicycle traffic, and river transportation systems. The name, taken from North Vietnamese president Ho Chi Minh, is of American origin. Within North Vietnam, it was called the Truong Son Road, after the mountain range in central Vietnam through which it passed.
ii) Pathet Laos.
The Pathet Lao ("Land of Laos") was a communist, nationalist political movement and organization in Laos, formed in the mid 20th century. The group was ultimately successful in assumung political power after a civil war, or insurgent revolution, lasting from the 1950s to 1975. The Pathet Lao were always closely associated with Vietnamese communists. During the civil war, it was effectively organized, equipped and even led by the army of North Vietnam.
The Pathet Lao were the Laotian equivalent of the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong of Vietnam. Eventually, the term was the generic name for Laotian communists. The political movement of the Pathet Lao was called first the Lao People's Party (1955-1972) and later the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (1972-present). After the Pathet Lao militarily won power, they were the government, rather than a nationalist insurgency, and the term was dropped. Unlike the Khmer Rouge, they were an extension of the Vietnamese Communist movement. Key Pathet Lao include Prince Souphanouvong, Kaysone Phomvihane, Phoumi Vongvichit, Nouhak Phoumsavanh and Khamtay Siphandone.
5) Questions on Malaysia
a) Explain what happend in 1969 and 1971 on the leadership of Malaysia.
Immediately after the riot, the government assumed emergency powers and suspended Parliament, which would only reconvene again in 1971. It also suspended the press and established a National Operations Council. The NOC's report on the riots stated, "The Malays who already felt excluded in the country's economic life, now began to feel a threat to their place in the public services," and implied this was a cause of the violence.
Western observers such as Time attributed the racial enmities to a political and economic system which primarily benefited the upper classes:
The Chinese and Indians resented Malay-backed plans favoring the majority, including one to make Malay the official school and government language. The poorer, more rural Malays became jealous of Chinese and Indian prosperity. Perhaps the Alliance's greatest failing was that it served to benefit primarily those at the top. ... For a Chinese or Indian who was not well-off, or for a Malay who was not well-connected, there was little largesse in the system. Even for those who were favored, hard feelings persisted. One towkay recently told a Malay official: "If it weren't for the Chinese, you Malays would be sitting on the floor without tables and chairs." Replied the official: "If I knew I could get every damned Chinaman out of the country, I would willingly go back to sitting on the floor.
The riot led to the expulsion of Malay nationalist Mahathir Mohamad from UMNO and propelled him to write his seminal work The Malay Dilemma, in which he posited a solution to Malaysia's racial tensions based on aiding the Malays economically through an affirmative action programme.
Tunku Abdul Rahman resigned as Prime Minister in the ensuing UMNO power struggle, the new perceived 'Malay-ultra' dominated government swiftly moved to placate Malays with the Malaysian New Economic Policy (NEP), enshrining affirmative action policies for the bumiputra (Malays and other indigenous Malaysians). Many of Malaysia's draconian press laws, originally targeting racial incitement, also date from this period. The Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971 named Articles 152, 153, and 181, and also Part III of the Constitution as specially protected, permitting Parliament to pass legislation that would limit dissent with regard to these provisions pertaining to the social contract. (The social contract is essentially a quid pro quo agreement between the Malay and non-Malay citizens of Malaysia; in return for granting the non-Malays citizenship at independence, symbols of Malay authority such as the Malay monarchy became national symbols, and the Malays were granted special economic privileges.) With this new power, Parliament then amended the Sedition Act accordingly. The new restrictions also applied to Members of Parliament, overruling Parliamentary immunity; at the same time, Article 159, which governs Constitutional amendments, was amended to entrench the "sensitive" Constitutional provisions; in addition to the consent of Parliament, any changes to the "sensitive" portions of the Constitution would now have to pass the Conference of Rulers, a body comprising the monarchs of the Malay states. At the same time, the Internal Security Act, which permits detention without trial, was also amended to stress "intercommunal harmony".
Despite the opposition of the DAP and PPP, the Alliance government passed the amendments, having maintained the necessary two-thirds Parliamentary majority. In Britain, the laws were condemned, with The Times of London stating they would "preserve as immutable the feudal system dominating Malay society" by "giving this archaic body of petty constitutional monarchs incredible blocking power"; the move was cast as hypocritical, given that Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak had spoken of "the full realisation that important matters must no longer be swept under the carpet..."
The Rukunegara, the de facto Malaysian pledge of allegiance, was another reaction to the riot. The pledge was introduced on August 31, 1970 as a way to foster unity among Malaysians.
b) Elaborate on the emergency period in 1948.
The Malayan Emergency was a state of emergency declared by the British colonial government of Malaya in 1948 and lifted in 1960, as well as an insurrection and guerrilla war fought between government forces and the Malayan National Liberation Army around the same period. The state of emergency entailed the revocation of many civil rights, the granting of special powers to the police, and other measures aimed at the suppression of left wing political movements, especially the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The guerrilla war, which is also known as the Malayan War, was part of the ongoing conflict between the MCP and other leftists, and the colonial establishment, starting shortly after the Japanese withdrawal in 1945 and extending at least to the signing of the peace treaty between the communists and the government of Malaya in 1989. The Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) was the military arm of the MCP; it was formed shortly after the Emergency was declared in 1948.
6)Questions on Myanmar
a) Write a page report on Aung San Su Kyi.
Aung San Suu Kyi is the daughter of one of Burma's most cherished heroes, the martyred General Aung San, who led his country's fight for independence from Great Britain in the 1940s and was killed for his beliefs in 1947. Suu Kyi has equaled her father's heroics with her calm but passionate advocacy of freedom and democracy in the country now called Myanmar, a name chosen by one of the most insensitive and brutal military dictatorships in the world.
Suu Kyi (pronounced Soo Chee) was two years old when her father, the de facto prime minister of newly independent Burma was assassinated. Though a Buddhist, the predominant religion of Burma, she was educated at Catholic schools and left for India in her mid-teens with her mother, who became the Burmese ambassador to India. Suu Kyi went to England where she studied at Oxford University. There she met Michael Aris, the Tibetan scholar whom she married. They had two sons, Alexander and Kim.
A watershed in her life was 1988, when Suu Kyi received a call from Burma that her mother had suffered a stroke and did not have long to live. Suu Kyi returned to Burma, leaving her husband and two children behind in England, having cautioned them years earlier that duty may one day call her back to her homeland.
She arrived back in Burma to nurse her mother at a time of a burgeoning pro-democracy movement, fueled by the energy and idealism among the country's young people. There were demonstrations against the repressive, one-party socialist government. Suu Kyi was drawn into the pro-democracy movement, which was snuffed out by SLORC, which seized power on September 18, 1988. Thousands of pro-democracy advocates were killed.
Next came a general election in 1990, which political parties were allowed to contest. Suu Kyi headed the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won a landslide victory, with 80 per cent support. This was not be tolerated by the SLORC leaders, who refused to recognize the election results. Worse, SLORC put the elected pro-democracy leaders under house arrest, including Suu Kyi.
Despite the restrictions of house arrest, Suu Kyi continued to campaign for democracy, and for this she won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991.
In 1999, Michael Aris, was dying of prostate cancer in England, where he lived with their two sons. He had repeatedly requested permission to visit his wife one last time before he died, but the SLORC authorities denied him entry, arguing that there are no proper facilities in the country to tend to a dying man. They suggested instead that Suu Kyi visit him in England. She refused, fearing if she ever left the country she would never be allowed to return.
The day Aris died, on his 53rd birthday on March 27, 1999, Suu Kyi honoured the occasion at her home in Rangoon, with 1,000 friends and supporters, including high-ranking diplomats from Europe and the United States. As part of a ceremony, she offered food and saffron robes to 53 Buddhist monks, one for each year of her husband's life. The monks recited prayers and chanted sutras. Instead of wearing her usual bright flowers and wreathes of jasmine, Suu Kyi chose instead a traditional black lungi with a white jacket. She cried only when one of the monks reminded the audience that the essence of Buddhism is to treat suffering with equanimity.
The police did not stop the supporters from visiting Suu Kyi in her time of grief. But they took the names and addresses of all those who attended at the service to honour the husband from whom she had been separated since she left England to tend to her dying mother.
b) Elaborate on Burmese way to Socialism.
The Burmese Way to Socialism is the name of the ideology of Burmese ruler, Ne Win, who ruled the country from 1962 to 1988. It included mainstream socialist ideals like the nationalisation of industries. However, it also encouraged more unorthodox views. These included a severe isolationism, expulsion of foreigners, discouragement of tourists, closing off of the economy, repression of minorities, and a police state. Ne Win's ideology also encouraged "bona fide" religion to make the people more selfless. In practice this meant encouraging or forcing a state-sanctioned form of Buddhism, although initially it claimed to favour religion generally rather than any specific religion. In practice Ne Win also relied on numerology in his system, but this was not officially part of it.
Opinions are mixed to the resulting effects of the implementation of this ideology. The positives cited include increased domestic stability and keeping Burma from being as entangled in the Cold War struggles that affected other Southeast Asian nations. However critics indicate it greatly increased poverty, isolation, and that it was even "disastrous." Ne Win's later attempt to make the currency base 9 proved purely negative and led the military to revolt. This caused the authoritarian "Burmese Way to Socialism" to be replaced by a new authoritarian system.
7)Questions on Philippines
a.)Name the agreement that have been made between Philippines and USA declaring colonial rule?
In 1901 when the United States effectively bought off the ilustrado elite, promising to maintain their wealth and power in return for collaboration with American colonial rule, most hostilities ended. The agreement of 1901 consolidated the power of the landed Chinese mestizo elite enabling them to dominate the political and economic structures of the Philippines in the 20th century. It also created Filipino elite that looked to the United States not only for economic and political patronage but also as its intellectual and cultural model. The ilustrado elite in the Philippines was a powerful landed elite with no parallel elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Its members’ social and political power stemmed from an economic base independent of the colonial state.
b.)Who was Benigno Aquino?
Benigno Aquino was President Marcos most prominent and popular political opponent, returned to the Philippines from his exile in the United States in August 1983. He failed to set foot on Philippine soil. As he descended the steps from his aircraft at Manila airport one of the accompanying soldiers assassinated him. The military leadership denied involvement, as did Marcos. The death of Aquino began a process of open resistance to Marcos, a resistance led by the Manila middle class.
Under pressure from the United States and still supremely confident of his ability to fix elections, Marcos called a snap Presidential election for early 1986. Despite the vote rigging he lost. In a few chaotic months in Manila, Cory Aquino, the widow of Benigno Aquino, claimed victory and prepared for an inauguration organised by her supporters. Marcos continued to claim victory, despite all the evidence to the contrary, and moved towards his own inauguration. The imminent danger of serious bloodshed, if not outright civil war, was averted when a number of significant army leaders deserted Marcos and moved over to support Aquino. Marcos fled the Philippines. Cory Aquino became President. ‘People power’ had won.
8)Questions on SINGAPORE
a.)State two reasons on why Singapore left the formation of Malaysia.
Singapore was separated from Malaysia in September 1965, becoming the independent Republic of Singapore. Formally, the exit of Singapore from Malaysia was a mutual decision between the Malaysian Federal Government and the Singapore State Government. In reality Singapore was forced to leave. The two years of marriage were unhappy ones.
The reasons are Malays increasingly feared that Singapore wanted to dominate Malaysia, and that the PAP was trying to join forces with the major ethnic Chinese opposition party in peninsular Malaya in order to gain a majority of the seats in the federal parliament. They feared changes to the constitution, which entrenched major privileges for the Malays. It was a highly emotional two years, with inter-ethnic typecasting abounding and with Malays fearing that ‘their’ country was about to be taken over by ‘foreigners’.
Lee Kuan Yew was personally shattered by the exit of Singapore from Malaysia. The accepted wisdom in Singapore was that its economy was so closely linked to that of peninsular Malaya that economic prosperity depended on these links continuing. Singapore feared that its economy was too small and too vulnerable to anti-Chinese feelings among neighbouring Indonesians and Malays to stand alone. Thirty years later Singapore is a major economic success story. Since independence in 1965 its economy has grown at an average of nine per cent per annum. In 1988 per capita income was almost ten times that of 1965. This economic growth is the cornerstone of the generally high standing of the PAP government among Singaporeans, despite western complaints about its style and frequent disregard for ‘western style’ civil liberties.
9)Questions on THAILAND
a.)Briefly explain the Bowring treaty.
The Bowring treaty was signed by King Mongkut (Rama IV, 1851–68) with Britain in 1855. Under this treaty import and export duties were sharply reduced and fixed, ruling class trading and commodity monopolies were abolished, and British subjects were granted extra-territorial legal rights. In subsequent years Mongkut signed similar treaties with many other Western powers. The signing away of legal power over foreign subjects in the kingdom was a bitter blow – these rights would not be fully recovered until the 1930s. More crucially, the other provisions of the treaties deprived the throne and many powerful subjects of much income. The shortfall would be reversed in time by the expansion of trade and by heavy taxes on opium, alcohol and gambling, but it is testimony to Mongkut’s domestic diplomatic skills, and to the cohesion of his court, that the major fiscal rearrangements passed without revolt.
b.)Explain the Strong Man era.
The Strong Man era took place during 1948 to 1973 and could be described as the resumption of military dominance over government initiated a succession of authoritarian leaders unchallenged by forces outside the military until 1973. Their power was enhanced by United States patronage and aid. Washington wanted strong anti-communist leaders who would both repress domestic communism (never more than a fringe phenomenon in Thailand in fact) and join in American-led strategies for the containment of Asian communism. From the 1950s United States aid to Thailand was substantial. It enabled much social and economic development, notably in communications, infrastructure and social welfare projects, but it also bolstered military and police power.
Even so the goal of stable government was not necessarily secured. American aid created new opportunities for corruption in Thai government and administration, and stimulated competition for the prizes of power between rival political networks anchored in the military but reaching into business and the bureaucracy. American appeals for some evidence of democracy in Thailand produced, in the short term, only cynical political manipulation, rigged elections and rubber-stamp parliaments from time to time.
After 1948 Phibun resumed many of his former repressive policies. He mounted another anti-Chinese campaign, and also attempted to impose cultural uniformity forcefully on the Malay-Muslims of the far south. The latter resisted the arrival of Thai officials, the introduction of Thai-language education and the substitution of Thai law for customary law. A separatist movement grew which, despite conciliation by later Thai governments, would persist to the present.
Despite the tough image which Phibun once more projected, his power was not in fact secure. He faced several attempted coups from within the military between 1948 and 1951. All were defeated, but at the price of the emergence of two further ‘strong men’ – army commander, subsequently Field Marshal, Sarit Thanarat (whose later spectacular wealth would be grounded in his control of the government lottery) and police chief Phao Siyanon (who would make his fortune from opium trafficking). In 1955 Phibun eased the controls on political activity and promised elections. Possibly he was under American pressure, possibly he hoped to outmanoeuvre his rivals by winning popular endorsement. However his party was accused of massive fraud during the 1957 election. Sarit won popularity by resigning, supposedly in disgust, from Phibun’s government. In September 1957 Sarit staged a coup, driving Phibun and Phao into exile.
In October 1958 Sarit declared martial law, silencing the experiments in open politics since 1955. Sarit justified his authoritarianism in two ways – he argued for a return to Thai traditions of social order, and he accelerated economic development and social modernisation. Under the former banner the monarchy was given renewed prominence.
King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX, 1946–present) attended public ceremonies, toured the provinces and patronised development projects, becoming a personally revered figure. Under the banner of development, Sarit introduced to government a new generation of economically liberal technocrats, encouraged private and foreign investment, launched major rural development programs and rapidly expanded educational facilities.
When Sarit died in December 1963 power transferred peacefully to his close associates Generals Thanom Kittikachorn (who became Prime Minister) and Praphas Charusathian (Deputy Prime Minister). Thanom and Praphas basically maintained Sarit’s style of government and economic policies, which produced GNP growth rates of over 8 per cent per year during the 1960s. At the same time the military’s place in the Thai political landscape seemed to loom larger than ever. United States aid increased sharply because of the Indochina conflicts. From 1964 Thailand provided bases for the United States airforce and committed its own troops to action in Vietnam and Laos. United States aid was also forthcoming to combat a communist insurgency which had taken root amongst alienated tribal groups in the country’s north and northeast.
The era of unquestioned ‘strong man’ rule was drawing to a close, however. Economic development, wider education and better communications were rapidly increasing the numbers of the politically aware. In 1968 Thanom proclaimed a new constitution, and in 1969 an election established a new parliament. The political public was shocked when he reversed direction in 1971, dissolving the parliament and banning political parties once more. By the early 70s several other issues were raising concern. The leaders’ presumed successor, Narong Kittikachorn (Thanom’s son and Praphas’ son-in-law), was not regarded highly inside or outside the military. Thailand’s close involvement with the United States obviously required rethinking as the United States moved to disengage from Vietnam and the region. The OPEC ‘oil shock’ and rising prices sent tremors through the economy.
It was the educated young who precipitated the downfall of the Thanom-Praphas regime. In October 1973 student protests against political repression (inspired to some extent by the Western student radicalism of the era) escalated into massive confrontation with the police on the streets of Bangkok. Popular sympathy for the students increased when police killed or wounded several students. In the first subtle indication of royal political opinion in many years, the King permitted student first-aid stations on royal ground. The demonstrators triumphed when the army withheld its support from Thanom, Praphas and Narong, who fled into exile.
c.)Detail out the many different military coup de tat Thai had experience.
There are series of military coup de tat that Thailand had experienced because the government itself had regulated in the constitution that if the current ruling party are cruel and suppress its own citizens in many ways either in social, politic, or economic, so they can be brought down by the military. Military are the watchdogs of the government actions and very concern with the needs of the people. However, they are also very strict in abusing power and common to use violence in order to achieve their objectives. The current situation was military coup against former Thai Prime Minister’s, Thaksin Sinawatra who was now exile in London for accusation of misused of power and corruption during his time of administration.
10)Questions on VIETNAM
a.)What was the Paris Peace Agreement?
In January 1973 the ‘Paris Peace Agreements’ were signed by the United States, the Saigon government (reluctantly, under intense United States pressure), the DRV and the PRG (the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the NLF). Crucially for the DRV/NLF, the first article of the agreements recognised the ‘independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity’ of Vietnam. Other articles called for a ceasefire, at which point the contending Vietnamese forces could claim whatever territory they held in the South, pending elections to determine the South’s future government. The agreements also called for the total withdrawal of United States troops and military personnel within 60 days. This article proved in fact to be the only one of the Paris agreements which was fully carried out. The American boys went home, but in South Vietnam war continued unabated.
The morale of the Southern forces began to slide, particularly after Nixon’s resignation in August 1974 over the Watergate scandal. His successor as President, Gerald Ford, had little influence over a Congress now disillusioned with the war and reluctant to sustain United States aid to the Saigon regime. In contrast, the DRV/NLF forces, legitimately ensconced in the South under the Paris agreements, were increasingly confident that victory was in sight. Guerrilla war had long since given way to conventional military tactics. By now the amount and sophisticated nature of their weaponry, supplied by their allies, matched that of the Southern forces.
Even so, the speed with which the war ended stunned both sides. DRV/NLF forces launched a limited offensive in the South’s central highlands in mid-March 1975. RVN forces panicked when ordered to retreat, creating a country-wide rout which was slowed by Southern detachments in only a handful of places. The Southern government collapsed, and DRV/NLF forces entered Saigon on 30th April. The last Americans remaining in South Vietnam had been evacuated just hours before, along with some leading Southerners closely identified with the American presence.
b.)Provide an illustration of French-Indochina.
An illustration of French-Indochina can be described when French forces moves in to acquire Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and later made it one big state called Indo-China. In 1859 a French naval expedition seized Saigon, following an unsuccessful attempt on the then more significant port of Da Nang, which was close to Hué. Emperor Tu Duc faced rebellion in the north and in 1862 conceded to the French, who gained by treaty, Saigon and its three surrounding provinces. In 1869 the French seized three further adjoining provinces, thus completing the territory of the colony they would call Cochin China.
The French conquered the remainder of Vietnam between 1883 and 1885, in the course of a complicated conflict in the country’s north. The north had collapsed in chaos fomented by both Vietnamese and expatriate Chinese rebels. The Vietnamese imperial government had lost all capacity to control events. Both China and France regarded Vietnam as their ‘sphere of influence’ and sent forces; the French eventually repelling the Chinese.
Monday, September 17, 2007
Monday, September 10, 2007
UNHAPPY ANNIVERSARY FOR ASEAN - MYANMAR
The 10th anniversary of Myanmar's accession to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a controversial act of engagement that at the time ran counter to the investment sanctions the United States had leveled against the country's military regime.
A decade later, ASEAN's hope that diplomatic inclusion would nudge Myanmar's military leaders toward more democracy has gone unrealized, and the tortuous process of negotiating with the hardline regime has badly undermined the grouping's regional clout and global credibility.
Arguably, ASEAN's Myanmar dilemma has now reached a crucial diplomatic juncture. Myanmar's membership in the 10-nation grouping has frequently raised European Union hackles, and Brussels has refused to conduct free-trade negotiations at a regional level with ASEAN because it would entail de facto dealing with Myanmar.
Meanwhile, US President George W Bush recently canceled a meeting with ASEAN leaders in Singapore during a scheduled Asia trip. Soon after, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that she too would skip the ASEAN Regional Forum, a strategic talk shop hosted by the grouping each year, scheduled for next month in Manila.
The Bush administration has been a strong critic of Myanmar's regime, with Rice publicly referring to the country as an "outpost of tyranny".
In 1997, many ASEAN members were cautiously optimistic the grouping could leverage its various government-to-government contacts with the reclusive regime to promote positive political change.
Former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan, who is now tipped to be ASEAN's next secretary general, in June 1998 advanced the notion that ASEAN should abandon its tenet of non-interference and adopt a policy of "constructive intervention" in dealing with Myanmar, which was later tweaked and became the blueprint for ASEAN's diplomacy toward the junta.
At the same time, there were geostrategic concerns that backing US sanctions would open the way for China to gain significant influence over a neighboring country. Although ASEAN was first formed as a five-member grouping in 1967 to guard against communist expansionism, particularly from Vietnam, the political reality since the end of the Vietnam War has been to enhance collectively member states' negotiating leverage and strategic deterrence with regard to China.
Critics - namely the US and anti-junta campaign groups in exile - have argued that the military government, which annulled the results of 1990 democratic elections it resoundingly lost, does not deserve the privilege or political legitimacy of ASEAN membership. However, ASEAN's outreach toward Myanmar was overshadowed at the time by the deteriorating political situation in Cambodia.
In July 1997, ASEAN took a moral stand and deferred Cambodia's joining after a bloody coup orchestrated by Prime Minster Hun Sen, which entailed the murder of several opposition politicians and a new wave of refugees into Thailand. ASEAN at the time declined to admit Cambodia until "free, fair and credible" elections were held. US rights group Human Rights Watch said at the time that ASEAN's role in Cambodia "has certainly been highly useful and constructive, and we hope that ASEAN will also become more active on [Myanmar]".
Trade reliance
ASEAN's moral sway over Myanmar has been negligible. Economically, however, ASEAN's pro-engagement policy has paved the way for more trade and investment. Myanmar's trade with ASEAN has risen dramatically since 1997, giving the military regime a desperately needed economic lifeline in the face of US-led trade and investment sanctions. Myanmar's trade with ASEAN, measured as a percentage of the country's total trade, increased from 44% in 2000 to 51.6% in 2005, official statistics show.
Of ASEAN's current 10 members - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar - only Laos has failed to diversify its trade mix outside of the region less than Myanmar. While much is made of China's economic influence over Myanmar, its total bilateral trade of US$1.2 billion in 2005 amounted to only half the amount ASEAN conducted with the country.
As Myanmar's economy has become more reliant on ASEAN goods and markets, some political analysts suggest the grouping has more political leverage over the regime than it has exercised. That economic integration is expected to increase, as all ASEAN members have committed to reduce tariffs to below 5% by the end of 2010, as part of the new ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement.
Beijing's willingness to overlook Myanmar's poor rights record, which certain ASEAN members have occasionally criticized, is speeding the two authoritarian countries' economic integration. When ASEAN members expressed their frustration at the slow pace of change in Myanmar, "the regime had essentially dumped it in favor of China", said Debbie Stothard of the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma.
One big indication that Myanmar is moving to hedge its ASEAN exposure: a new $1 billion gas pipeline linking Sittway, Myanmar, to Kunming in southwestern China, set for groundbreaking at the end of this year. Analysts note that the pipeline deal was sealed shortly after Beijing vetoed a US-led United Nations Security Council resolution against Myanmar's rights record in January.
ASEAN, on the other hand, sat on the fence during the resolution's vote - Indonesia, the only member of the bloc currently a member of the Security Council, symbolically abstained. Yet in 2006 ASEAN applied uncharacteristic diplomatic pressure on Myanmar to demonstrate progress on its so-called "roadmap toward democracy". In March, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Yangon to follow up and was closely followed by Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar that month.
In his capacity as an ASEAN representative, Albar was charged with inspecting Myanmar's "democratization process", but his trip ended in frustration when he was barred from meeting with members of the opposition National League for Democracy, which won the annulled 1990 polls.
Albar flew out of Myanmar a day earlier than scheduled and, by some accounts, ASEAN's already strained relationship with Myanmar hit a new nadir. Past and current United Nations overtures, including the new round of outreach by the new UN secretary general's special representative on Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, meanwhile to date have wholly failed to produce any democratic progress.
Charter hopes
Now, ASEAN is finally upping the diplomatic ante in a move that will seemingly make or break its relations with Myanmar. In a significant departure from the grouping's erstwhile tenet of non-interference, by next year ASEAN is expected to adopt a framework that will legally bind its members to a charter that enshrines democratic values, good governance, and respect for human rights and freedoms.
Roshan Jason, spokesman for the ASEAN inter-parliamentary caucus on Myanmar, a group of regional parliamentary members aimed at pushing for political change in that country, said the new charter represents "one more opportunity to tackle Myanmar, once and for all". ASEAN "must show the political will to do so", he told Asia Times Online.
Speaking to reporters in Singapore on Tuesday, ASEAN secretary general Ong Keng Yong said the group charter was aimed at Myanmar, but he significantly ruled out the possibility of punitive measures for non-compliance. That would appear to give the junta yet another escape route - although non-compliance would no doubt open the regime to harsh criticism among ASEAN members.
Already it seems the junta is in denial about the new charter's actual commitments. In a May editorial run in the government mouthpiece New Light of Myanmar, Myat Thu, a member of the Myanmar delegation involved in charter discussions in Manila, was quoted saying, "The meeting chairman explained ... the charter would not feature human rights and the discussions would not focus on matters on termination of charter member countries."
The next meeting on the ASEAN charter is set for next week in Manila, and a draft is expected to be submitted for approval to the ASEAN summit in Singapore this November.
In 1997, ASEAN assured the West that it could cajole the junta on to a more democratic path. Ten years later, through the new charter initiative, the grouping appears to be finally following through on that pledge. How much longer Myanmar decides to remain in the regional club, however, is an open question.
Extract From : Clive Parker (ASIA TIMES ONLINE)
A decade later, ASEAN's hope that diplomatic inclusion would nudge Myanmar's military leaders toward more democracy has gone unrealized, and the tortuous process of negotiating with the hardline regime has badly undermined the grouping's regional clout and global credibility.
Arguably, ASEAN's Myanmar dilemma has now reached a crucial diplomatic juncture. Myanmar's membership in the 10-nation grouping has frequently raised European Union hackles, and Brussels has refused to conduct free-trade negotiations at a regional level with ASEAN because it would entail de facto dealing with Myanmar.
Meanwhile, US President George W Bush recently canceled a meeting with ASEAN leaders in Singapore during a scheduled Asia trip. Soon after, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that she too would skip the ASEAN Regional Forum, a strategic talk shop hosted by the grouping each year, scheduled for next month in Manila.
The Bush administration has been a strong critic of Myanmar's regime, with Rice publicly referring to the country as an "outpost of tyranny".
In 1997, many ASEAN members were cautiously optimistic the grouping could leverage its various government-to-government contacts with the reclusive regime to promote positive political change.
Former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan, who is now tipped to be ASEAN's next secretary general, in June 1998 advanced the notion that ASEAN should abandon its tenet of non-interference and adopt a policy of "constructive intervention" in dealing with Myanmar, which was later tweaked and became the blueprint for ASEAN's diplomacy toward the junta.
At the same time, there were geostrategic concerns that backing US sanctions would open the way for China to gain significant influence over a neighboring country. Although ASEAN was first formed as a five-member grouping in 1967 to guard against communist expansionism, particularly from Vietnam, the political reality since the end of the Vietnam War has been to enhance collectively member states' negotiating leverage and strategic deterrence with regard to China.
Critics - namely the US and anti-junta campaign groups in exile - have argued that the military government, which annulled the results of 1990 democratic elections it resoundingly lost, does not deserve the privilege or political legitimacy of ASEAN membership. However, ASEAN's outreach toward Myanmar was overshadowed at the time by the deteriorating political situation in Cambodia.
In July 1997, ASEAN took a moral stand and deferred Cambodia's joining after a bloody coup orchestrated by Prime Minster Hun Sen, which entailed the murder of several opposition politicians and a new wave of refugees into Thailand. ASEAN at the time declined to admit Cambodia until "free, fair and credible" elections were held. US rights group Human Rights Watch said at the time that ASEAN's role in Cambodia "has certainly been highly useful and constructive, and we hope that ASEAN will also become more active on [Myanmar]".
Trade reliance
ASEAN's moral sway over Myanmar has been negligible. Economically, however, ASEAN's pro-engagement policy has paved the way for more trade and investment. Myanmar's trade with ASEAN has risen dramatically since 1997, giving the military regime a desperately needed economic lifeline in the face of US-led trade and investment sanctions. Myanmar's trade with ASEAN, measured as a percentage of the country's total trade, increased from 44% in 2000 to 51.6% in 2005, official statistics show.
Of ASEAN's current 10 members - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar - only Laos has failed to diversify its trade mix outside of the region less than Myanmar. While much is made of China's economic influence over Myanmar, its total bilateral trade of US$1.2 billion in 2005 amounted to only half the amount ASEAN conducted with the country.
As Myanmar's economy has become more reliant on ASEAN goods and markets, some political analysts suggest the grouping has more political leverage over the regime than it has exercised. That economic integration is expected to increase, as all ASEAN members have committed to reduce tariffs to below 5% by the end of 2010, as part of the new ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement.
Beijing's willingness to overlook Myanmar's poor rights record, which certain ASEAN members have occasionally criticized, is speeding the two authoritarian countries' economic integration. When ASEAN members expressed their frustration at the slow pace of change in Myanmar, "the regime had essentially dumped it in favor of China", said Debbie Stothard of the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma.
One big indication that Myanmar is moving to hedge its ASEAN exposure: a new $1 billion gas pipeline linking Sittway, Myanmar, to Kunming in southwestern China, set for groundbreaking at the end of this year. Analysts note that the pipeline deal was sealed shortly after Beijing vetoed a US-led United Nations Security Council resolution against Myanmar's rights record in January.
ASEAN, on the other hand, sat on the fence during the resolution's vote - Indonesia, the only member of the bloc currently a member of the Security Council, symbolically abstained. Yet in 2006 ASEAN applied uncharacteristic diplomatic pressure on Myanmar to demonstrate progress on its so-called "roadmap toward democracy". In March, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Yangon to follow up and was closely followed by Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar that month.
In his capacity as an ASEAN representative, Albar was charged with inspecting Myanmar's "democratization process", but his trip ended in frustration when he was barred from meeting with members of the opposition National League for Democracy, which won the annulled 1990 polls.
Albar flew out of Myanmar a day earlier than scheduled and, by some accounts, ASEAN's already strained relationship with Myanmar hit a new nadir. Past and current United Nations overtures, including the new round of outreach by the new UN secretary general's special representative on Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, meanwhile to date have wholly failed to produce any democratic progress.
Charter hopes
Now, ASEAN is finally upping the diplomatic ante in a move that will seemingly make or break its relations with Myanmar. In a significant departure from the grouping's erstwhile tenet of non-interference, by next year ASEAN is expected to adopt a framework that will legally bind its members to a charter that enshrines democratic values, good governance, and respect for human rights and freedoms.
Roshan Jason, spokesman for the ASEAN inter-parliamentary caucus on Myanmar, a group of regional parliamentary members aimed at pushing for political change in that country, said the new charter represents "one more opportunity to tackle Myanmar, once and for all". ASEAN "must show the political will to do so", he told Asia Times Online.
Speaking to reporters in Singapore on Tuesday, ASEAN secretary general Ong Keng Yong said the group charter was aimed at Myanmar, but he significantly ruled out the possibility of punitive measures for non-compliance. That would appear to give the junta yet another escape route - although non-compliance would no doubt open the regime to harsh criticism among ASEAN members.
Already it seems the junta is in denial about the new charter's actual commitments. In a May editorial run in the government mouthpiece New Light of Myanmar, Myat Thu, a member of the Myanmar delegation involved in charter discussions in Manila, was quoted saying, "The meeting chairman explained ... the charter would not feature human rights and the discussions would not focus on matters on termination of charter member countries."
The next meeting on the ASEAN charter is set for next week in Manila, and a draft is expected to be submitted for approval to the ASEAN summit in Singapore this November.
In 1997, ASEAN assured the West that it could cajole the junta on to a more democratic path. Ten years later, through the new charter initiative, the grouping appears to be finally following through on that pledge. How much longer Myanmar decides to remain in the regional club, however, is an open question.
Extract From : Clive Parker (ASIA TIMES ONLINE)
CLASS CLASH MARS MALAYSIA-INDONESIA TIES
They share the same Malay cultural roots and Islamic faith, but the poor treatment of Indonesian workers in Malaysia has soured relations between the Southeast Asian neighbors. Political commentators view the growing clash as one arising from class rather than ethnicity or even nationalism.
In the latest flare-up, thousands of young Indonesians burned Malaysian flags and demonstrated in front of the Malaysian Embassy in Jakarta and consulates elsewhere after the physical assault of an Indonesian karate coach by Malaysian police. The fact that the police were hunting for illegal Indonesian immigrants at the time has also inflamed tensions in Indonesia.
Donald Luther Kolobita, 47, was part of the Indonesian team competing in the Asian Karate Championships in Kuala Lumpur on August 24 when he was confronted by four plainclothes police officers late at night outside his hotel. Thinking they were trying to rob him, Kolobita put up a fight before he was overpowered, handcuffed and taken to the police station, where he was savagely assaulted.
Kolobita returned to Jakarta in a wheelchair and the Indonesian team withdrew from the championship. The Speaker of Indonesia's parliament, Agung Laksono, called the attack "an arrogant act on the part of the Malaysian police against an Indonesian citizen", and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono demanded that the Malaysian police apologize.
On Friday, Malaysian Police Chief Musa Hassan sent a written apology to Kolobita, which was hand-delivered to his hospital bedside in Jakarta by Malaysian Ambassador Zainal Abidin Zain. But anger in Indonesia has not yet subsided, with young activists continuing their protests outside the Malaysian Embassy.
The episode represents the latest in a series of complaints about the ill-treatment of Indonesians in Malaysia, especially among migrant workers. There are almost 600,000 officially documented Indonesian workers in Malaysia and, according to unofficial estimates, there may be an equal number of illegal workers in the country.
An estimated 27% of the Indonesian legal workers serve as domestic maids. A spate of documented abuse cases against domestic servants has intensified Indonesia’s anger over a heavy-handed crackdown on illegal workers.
"Malays in Malaysia always think of Javanese [Indonesians] as ethnically inferior compared with them," said Ade Armando, a communications lecturer at the University of Indonesia. "This is justified by the fact that the Indonesians they mostly see are laborers or maids."
Yap Swee Seng, executive director of the Malaysian human-rights group Suaram, argues that the anger expressed by Indonesians is indicative of the "long-accumulated anger against Malaysia for its rampant abuse, exploitation and human-rights violations of Indonesian migrant workers". He contends that the Malaysian government is not committed to stopping abuse.
"There have been too many abuse cases with almost total impunity enjoyed by the perpetuators," Yap said. "The majority of the Indonesian migrant workers have been employed in the '3-D' jobs - dangerous, discriminatory and degrading. Therefore, there are widespread discriminatory and arrogant attitudes against the migrant workers in general."
Just a few days before the attack on Kolobita, the Indonesian government, prompted by the death of a 24-year-old maid at the hands of abusive employers, stepped up pressure on Malaysia to take swift action against the broad ill-treatment of Indonesian workers. In the past three months, there were two cases of Indonesian maids being rescued by firefighters after they were spotted hanging from window ledges of highrise condominiums trying to escape their abusive employers. Maids often suffer and report physical attacks, but prosecutions are rare.
Irene Fernandez, director of Tenaganita, a leading migrant workers' rights group, said this year that on average 150-200 migrant workers, the majority of them maids, seek refuge at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur every month. She blamed both the Malaysian and Indonesian governments for failing to protect the rights of migrant workers.
"As long as the Malaysian government does not address this fundamental issue, such incidents will continue to happen," she told Al-Jazeera television in a recent interview.
Yap agrees. "Domestic workers are among the most abused people in Malaysia, as they work in isolated and insulated environments," he said. "They should be allowed one rest day in a week and be allowed to meet with their friends, and join or form trade unions, so that they will have a support system."
Yap argued that there should be "a total reform in the policy and legal system in Malaysia in dealing with migrant workers" and that without such reforms the Malaysian government "will be equally guilty by its inaction against such human-rights violations".
Armando said: "I do not think we as a nation are so angry with Malaysia." He argued that rather than protesting against Malaysia, young people in Jakarta should protest to the Indonesian government for "failing to provide our people with the type of job opportunities that are offered in Malaysia".
He said the two countries' middle classes have considerable mutual respect and noted that Indonesian cultural products can be found everywhere in Malaysia.
"I believe, to some extent, the Malaysian younger middle classes envy the type of freedom enjoyed by their counterparts in Indonesia," he said.
Extract from : Kalinga Seneviratne (ASIA TIMES ONLINE)
In the latest flare-up, thousands of young Indonesians burned Malaysian flags and demonstrated in front of the Malaysian Embassy in Jakarta and consulates elsewhere after the physical assault of an Indonesian karate coach by Malaysian police. The fact that the police were hunting for illegal Indonesian immigrants at the time has also inflamed tensions in Indonesia.
Donald Luther Kolobita, 47, was part of the Indonesian team competing in the Asian Karate Championships in Kuala Lumpur on August 24 when he was confronted by four plainclothes police officers late at night outside his hotel. Thinking they were trying to rob him, Kolobita put up a fight before he was overpowered, handcuffed and taken to the police station, where he was savagely assaulted.
Kolobita returned to Jakarta in a wheelchair and the Indonesian team withdrew from the championship. The Speaker of Indonesia's parliament, Agung Laksono, called the attack "an arrogant act on the part of the Malaysian police against an Indonesian citizen", and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono demanded that the Malaysian police apologize.
On Friday, Malaysian Police Chief Musa Hassan sent a written apology to Kolobita, which was hand-delivered to his hospital bedside in Jakarta by Malaysian Ambassador Zainal Abidin Zain. But anger in Indonesia has not yet subsided, with young activists continuing their protests outside the Malaysian Embassy.
The episode represents the latest in a series of complaints about the ill-treatment of Indonesians in Malaysia, especially among migrant workers. There are almost 600,000 officially documented Indonesian workers in Malaysia and, according to unofficial estimates, there may be an equal number of illegal workers in the country.
An estimated 27% of the Indonesian legal workers serve as domestic maids. A spate of documented abuse cases against domestic servants has intensified Indonesia’s anger over a heavy-handed crackdown on illegal workers.
"Malays in Malaysia always think of Javanese [Indonesians] as ethnically inferior compared with them," said Ade Armando, a communications lecturer at the University of Indonesia. "This is justified by the fact that the Indonesians they mostly see are laborers or maids."
Yap Swee Seng, executive director of the Malaysian human-rights group Suaram, argues that the anger expressed by Indonesians is indicative of the "long-accumulated anger against Malaysia for its rampant abuse, exploitation and human-rights violations of Indonesian migrant workers". He contends that the Malaysian government is not committed to stopping abuse.
"There have been too many abuse cases with almost total impunity enjoyed by the perpetuators," Yap said. "The majority of the Indonesian migrant workers have been employed in the '3-D' jobs - dangerous, discriminatory and degrading. Therefore, there are widespread discriminatory and arrogant attitudes against the migrant workers in general."
Just a few days before the attack on Kolobita, the Indonesian government, prompted by the death of a 24-year-old maid at the hands of abusive employers, stepped up pressure on Malaysia to take swift action against the broad ill-treatment of Indonesian workers. In the past three months, there were two cases of Indonesian maids being rescued by firefighters after they were spotted hanging from window ledges of highrise condominiums trying to escape their abusive employers. Maids often suffer and report physical attacks, but prosecutions are rare.
Irene Fernandez, director of Tenaganita, a leading migrant workers' rights group, said this year that on average 150-200 migrant workers, the majority of them maids, seek refuge at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur every month. She blamed both the Malaysian and Indonesian governments for failing to protect the rights of migrant workers.
"As long as the Malaysian government does not address this fundamental issue, such incidents will continue to happen," she told Al-Jazeera television in a recent interview.
Yap agrees. "Domestic workers are among the most abused people in Malaysia, as they work in isolated and insulated environments," he said. "They should be allowed one rest day in a week and be allowed to meet with their friends, and join or form trade unions, so that they will have a support system."
Yap argued that there should be "a total reform in the policy and legal system in Malaysia in dealing with migrant workers" and that without such reforms the Malaysian government "will be equally guilty by its inaction against such human-rights violations".
Armando said: "I do not think we as a nation are so angry with Malaysia." He argued that rather than protesting against Malaysia, young people in Jakarta should protest to the Indonesian government for "failing to provide our people with the type of job opportunities that are offered in Malaysia".
He said the two countries' middle classes have considerable mutual respect and noted that Indonesian cultural products can be found everywhere in Malaysia.
"I believe, to some extent, the Malaysian younger middle classes envy the type of freedom enjoyed by their counterparts in Indonesia," he said.
Extract from : Kalinga Seneviratne (ASIA TIMES ONLINE)
BIRTHDAY BLUES FOR ASEAN
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) turned 40 this summer, raising the question of whether the regional grouping is facing a mid-life crisis. Or, alternatively, is it on the verge of maturing into a more cohesive and relevant organization capable of carrying out its self-proclaimed "driver's seat" role in East Asia community-building?
Only time will tell, but there are some encouraging signs that ASEAN may be coming of age, beginning with the creation of the new ASEAN Charter to manage "the key challenges of regional integration, globalization, economic growth, and new technologies". A formal charter would add a "legal personality" and a greater degree of cohesiveness and clarity to earlier efforts to build an ASEAN community (or more precisely, three interrelated communities: an ASEAN security community, an ASEAN economic community and an ASEAN socio-cultural community).
ASEAN's Eminent Persons Group (EPG) provided the assembled leadership a draft charter at the 2006 annual ASEAN summit in Cebu, Philippines. Since then, an ASEAN high-level task force has been hard at work, refining (read: toning down) some of the more dramatic suggestions, such as a controversial section recommending sanctions, including expulsion from ASEAN, for those violating the charter, which has reportedly been dropped.
The EPG also recommended that ASEAN relax its full-consensus decision-making style; it remains to be seen whether this suggestion, and one opposing "extra-constitutional" methods of changing government, as happened last year in Thailand, will make the final cut.
One controversial provision that apparently did make the cut last month was the establishment of a new Human Rights Commission, over initial objections by Myanmar, among others. While the final version has not yet been seen - it is scheduled to be unveiled and approved at the November ASEAN summit in Singapore - the charter is expected to "accelerate ASEAN integration" while making it a more "rules-based" organization.
One ASEAN senior official noted that the new charter "would also help put into place a system in which more ASEAN agreements would be effectively implemented and enforced long after the symbolic signing ceremonies". To those who have long accused ASEAN of valuing form over substance, this will be a welcome development.
More good news came in the naming of former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan as ASEAN's next secretary general, effective next January. Surin, a Muslim, is seen as a proactive supporter of greater "constructive engagement" both within ASEAN and between ASEAN and its neighbors. He will, according to incumbent secretary general Ong Keng Yong, "have a clear direction and more of a mandate" as a result of the charter. There is no questioning his energy, enthusiasm, and commitment - what remains to be seen is how much of a collective voice he will be able to employ, and to what end.
As part of its "coming of age" process, ASEAN is also developing a "plan of action" to enhance its 10-year-old Treaty of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), which prohibits the development, testing, or basing of nuclear weapons within its territories while permitting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
I would offer a suggestion to those tasked with drawing up the implementation plan, namely an amendment to the SEANWFZ that would prohibit reprocessing or enrichment activities within the region, thus closing one of the current Non-Proliferation Treaty loopholes that have contributed to the current difficulties with North Korea and Iran. This should increase the treaty’s attractiveness to those parties, including the United States, that have not yet acceded to the treaty.
Meanwhile, Washington's relations with ASEAN have never been deeper while appearing so shallow. US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, at last month's annual ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, applauded the effort to develop a charter that "strengthened democratic values, good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and freedom".
He also marked the 30th anniversary of US-ASEAN relations by refining and strengthening the Enhanced Partnership Plan of Action signed between Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her ASEAN counterparts during the July 2006 ARF meeting. This action plan grew out of the Enhanced Partnership joint vision statement announced by US President George W Bush and assembled ASEAN leaders during the first ever US-ASEAN summit along the sidelines of the November 2005 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders' meeting.
The plan of action guides cooperation as ASEAN advances toward its goal of political, economic and social integration while enhancing cooperation on critical transnational challenges such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, infectious diseases, and protecting the environment.
It complements the August 2006 US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement that established a regular and formal dialogue on trade and investment matters and a joint work plan to enhance two-way trade that exceeded US$168 billion last year. Collectively, ASEAN is America's fourth-largest trading partner; to date, US companies have invested nearly $90 billion in ASEAN countries.
That's the good news. Unfortunately, when it comes to US-ASEAN relations, form has not matched substance. Rice this year missed her second ARF meeting (out of three opportunities) and Bush canceled the full US-ASEAN summit, which had been planned by Singapore after this year's APEC summit.
As a result, Bush's third summit with the "ASEAN Seven" - the ASEAN members of APEC (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam; the other members of ASEAN are Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) - appears to be a consolation prize, rather than another significant step forward. One frequently hears the accusation that Washington is "neglecting" Southeast Asia, despite the above-cited significant advancements.
To correct this perception, and given the fact that Bush has yet to make his first trip to East Asia this year, serious consideration should be given to arranging such a visit coincident with this year's Singapore-hosted East Asia Summit, to underscore Washington's support for ASEAN's coming-of-age process. It would further permit Bush to be invited as a special guest to the East Asia Summit, while skirting tricky membership questions, thus showing support for East Asia community-building as well.
Only time will tell, but there are some encouraging signs that ASEAN may be coming of age, beginning with the creation of the new ASEAN Charter to manage "the key challenges of regional integration, globalization, economic growth, and new technologies". A formal charter would add a "legal personality" and a greater degree of cohesiveness and clarity to earlier efforts to build an ASEAN community (or more precisely, three interrelated communities: an ASEAN security community, an ASEAN economic community and an ASEAN socio-cultural community).
ASEAN's Eminent Persons Group (EPG) provided the assembled leadership a draft charter at the 2006 annual ASEAN summit in Cebu, Philippines. Since then, an ASEAN high-level task force has been hard at work, refining (read: toning down) some of the more dramatic suggestions, such as a controversial section recommending sanctions, including expulsion from ASEAN, for those violating the charter, which has reportedly been dropped.
The EPG also recommended that ASEAN relax its full-consensus decision-making style; it remains to be seen whether this suggestion, and one opposing "extra-constitutional" methods of changing government, as happened last year in Thailand, will make the final cut.
One controversial provision that apparently did make the cut last month was the establishment of a new Human Rights Commission, over initial objections by Myanmar, among others. While the final version has not yet been seen - it is scheduled to be unveiled and approved at the November ASEAN summit in Singapore - the charter is expected to "accelerate ASEAN integration" while making it a more "rules-based" organization.
One ASEAN senior official noted that the new charter "would also help put into place a system in which more ASEAN agreements would be effectively implemented and enforced long after the symbolic signing ceremonies". To those who have long accused ASEAN of valuing form over substance, this will be a welcome development.
More good news came in the naming of former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan as ASEAN's next secretary general, effective next January. Surin, a Muslim, is seen as a proactive supporter of greater "constructive engagement" both within ASEAN and between ASEAN and its neighbors. He will, according to incumbent secretary general Ong Keng Yong, "have a clear direction and more of a mandate" as a result of the charter. There is no questioning his energy, enthusiasm, and commitment - what remains to be seen is how much of a collective voice he will be able to employ, and to what end.
As part of its "coming of age" process, ASEAN is also developing a "plan of action" to enhance its 10-year-old Treaty of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), which prohibits the development, testing, or basing of nuclear weapons within its territories while permitting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
I would offer a suggestion to those tasked with drawing up the implementation plan, namely an amendment to the SEANWFZ that would prohibit reprocessing or enrichment activities within the region, thus closing one of the current Non-Proliferation Treaty loopholes that have contributed to the current difficulties with North Korea and Iran. This should increase the treaty’s attractiveness to those parties, including the United States, that have not yet acceded to the treaty.
Meanwhile, Washington's relations with ASEAN have never been deeper while appearing so shallow. US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, at last month's annual ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, applauded the effort to develop a charter that "strengthened democratic values, good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and freedom".
He also marked the 30th anniversary of US-ASEAN relations by refining and strengthening the Enhanced Partnership Plan of Action signed between Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her ASEAN counterparts during the July 2006 ARF meeting. This action plan grew out of the Enhanced Partnership joint vision statement announced by US President George W Bush and assembled ASEAN leaders during the first ever US-ASEAN summit along the sidelines of the November 2005 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders' meeting.
The plan of action guides cooperation as ASEAN advances toward its goal of political, economic and social integration while enhancing cooperation on critical transnational challenges such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, infectious diseases, and protecting the environment.
It complements the August 2006 US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement that established a regular and formal dialogue on trade and investment matters and a joint work plan to enhance two-way trade that exceeded US$168 billion last year. Collectively, ASEAN is America's fourth-largest trading partner; to date, US companies have invested nearly $90 billion in ASEAN countries.
That's the good news. Unfortunately, when it comes to US-ASEAN relations, form has not matched substance. Rice this year missed her second ARF meeting (out of three opportunities) and Bush canceled the full US-ASEAN summit, which had been planned by Singapore after this year's APEC summit.
As a result, Bush's third summit with the "ASEAN Seven" - the ASEAN members of APEC (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam; the other members of ASEAN are Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) - appears to be a consolation prize, rather than another significant step forward. One frequently hears the accusation that Washington is "neglecting" Southeast Asia, despite the above-cited significant advancements.
To correct this perception, and given the fact that Bush has yet to make his first trip to East Asia this year, serious consideration should be given to arranging such a visit coincident with this year's Singapore-hosted East Asia Summit, to underscore Washington's support for ASEAN's coming-of-age process. It would further permit Bush to be invited as a special guest to the East Asia Summit, while skirting tricky membership questions, thus showing support for East Asia community-building as well.
OFFICIAL MEETINGS SET UP BY ASEAN
ASEAN Summit
The organization holds meetings, known as the ASEAN Summit, where heads of government of each member meet to discuss and resolve regional issues, as well as to conduct other meetings with other countries outside of the bloc with the intention of promoting external relations.
The ASEAN Leaders' Formal Summit was first held in Bali, Indonesia in 1976. Its third meeting was held in Manila in 1987 and during this meeting, it was decided that the leaders would meet every five years. Consequently, the fourth meeting was held in Singapore in 1992 where the leaders again agreed to meet more frequently, deciding to hold the summit every three years. In 2001, it was decided to meet annually to address urgent issues affecting the region. Member nations were assigned to be the summit host in alphabetical order except in the case of Myanmar which dropped its 2006 hosting rights in 2004 due to pressure from the United States and the European Union.
The formal summit meets for three days. The usual itinerary is as follows:
• Leaders of member states would hold an internal organization meeting.
• Leaders of member states would hold a conference together with foreign ministers of the ASEAN Regional Forum.
• A meeting, known as ASEAN Plus Three, is set for leaders of three Dialogue Partners (People's Republic of China, Japan, South Korea)
• A separate meeting, known as ASEAN-CER, is set for another set of leaders of two Dialogue Partners (Australia, New Zealand).
During the fifth Summit in Bangkok, the leaders decided to meet "informally" between each formal summit:
East Asia Summit
The East Asia Summit (EAS) is a pan-Asian forum held annually by the leaders of 16 countries in East Asia and the region, with ASEAN in a leadership position. Russia has applied for membership and as of 2005, attends on observer status. The first summit was held in Kuala Lumpur on December 14, 2005 and subsequent meetings have been held after the annual ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting.
ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Regional Forum:
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an informal multilateral dialogue in Asia Pacific region. As of July 2006, it is consisted of 26 participants. ARF objectives are to foster dialogue and consultation, and promote confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region. The ARF met for the first time in 1994. The current participants in the ARF are as follows: all ASEAN members, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the European Union, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Timor-Leste, and the United States.
Other meetings
Aside from the ones above, other regular meetings are also held. These include the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as well as other smaller committees, such as the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center. Meetings mostly focus on specific topics, such as defense or the environment, and are attended by Ministers, instead of heads of government.
ASEAN Plus Three
The ASEAN Plus Three is a meeting between ASEAN, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea, and is primarily held during each ASEAN Summit.
Asia-Europe Meeting
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an informal dialogue process initiated in 1996, bringing together the European Union and the ASEAN Plus Three groupings.
ASEAN-Russia Summit
The ASEAN-Russia Summit is a meeting between leaders member states and the President of Russia.
The organization holds meetings, known as the ASEAN Summit, where heads of government of each member meet to discuss and resolve regional issues, as well as to conduct other meetings with other countries outside of the bloc with the intention of promoting external relations.
The ASEAN Leaders' Formal Summit was first held in Bali, Indonesia in 1976. Its third meeting was held in Manila in 1987 and during this meeting, it was decided that the leaders would meet every five years. Consequently, the fourth meeting was held in Singapore in 1992 where the leaders again agreed to meet more frequently, deciding to hold the summit every three years. In 2001, it was decided to meet annually to address urgent issues affecting the region. Member nations were assigned to be the summit host in alphabetical order except in the case of Myanmar which dropped its 2006 hosting rights in 2004 due to pressure from the United States and the European Union.
The formal summit meets for three days. The usual itinerary is as follows:
• Leaders of member states would hold an internal organization meeting.
• Leaders of member states would hold a conference together with foreign ministers of the ASEAN Regional Forum.
• A meeting, known as ASEAN Plus Three, is set for leaders of three Dialogue Partners (People's Republic of China, Japan, South Korea)
• A separate meeting, known as ASEAN-CER, is set for another set of leaders of two Dialogue Partners (Australia, New Zealand).
During the fifth Summit in Bangkok, the leaders decided to meet "informally" between each formal summit:
East Asia Summit
The East Asia Summit (EAS) is a pan-Asian forum held annually by the leaders of 16 countries in East Asia and the region, with ASEAN in a leadership position. Russia has applied for membership and as of 2005, attends on observer status. The first summit was held in Kuala Lumpur on December 14, 2005 and subsequent meetings have been held after the annual ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting.
ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Regional Forum:
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an informal multilateral dialogue in Asia Pacific region. As of July 2006, it is consisted of 26 participants. ARF objectives are to foster dialogue and consultation, and promote confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region. The ARF met for the first time in 1994. The current participants in the ARF are as follows: all ASEAN members, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the European Union, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Timor-Leste, and the United States.
Other meetings
Aside from the ones above, other regular meetings are also held. These include the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as well as other smaller committees, such as the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center. Meetings mostly focus on specific topics, such as defense or the environment, and are attended by Ministers, instead of heads of government.
ASEAN Plus Three
The ASEAN Plus Three is a meeting between ASEAN, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea, and is primarily held during each ASEAN Summit.
Asia-Europe Meeting
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an informal dialogue process initiated in 1996, bringing together the European Union and the ASEAN Plus Three groupings.
ASEAN-Russia Summit
The ASEAN-Russia Summit is a meeting between leaders member states and the President of Russia.
Monday, August 27, 2007
THAILAND : THAILAND AND POST-THAKSIN POLITICS
Thailand's once-mighty Thai Rak Thai party may been dissolved by the courts because of irregularities during an annulled general election in April last year, and its leader, and former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, may be facing corruption charges in court and have been banned from political activities for a five-year period - but he is also showing very clearly that he is not going to be silenced by such actions by the post-coup Thai state.
In a highly-publicised move in mid-June, he announced from his exile in London that he intended to buy Manchester City Football Club for a staggering 86.1 million British pounds. That has kept him in the public eye - at the same time as he has shown that he still has money, despite the fact that the courts have frozen more than 50 billion Baht in his Thai bank accounts. And it was money that helped him win two previous elections, 2001 and 2005, when Thai Rak Thai for the first time in Thai history that a single party secured an absolute majority in the now dissolved House of Representatives.
But it may not be that easy this time, even if Thai Rak Thai is resurrected under another name. On June 24, local mayoral elections were held in the northern city of Chiang Mai, Thaksin's hometown and long considered a Thai Rak Thai stronghold. Duentemduang na Chiang Mai, a former MP for the Democrats, which has ruled the country off and on since the end of World War II and the main opposition party when Thaksin was in power, won a landslide victory. Her arch-rival and former mayor, Boonlert Buranupakorn, and his former aid Pornchai Jittanavasathien - both considered Thaksin loyalists - were defeated, despite widespread allegations of vote-buying and attempts to block Duentemduang's candidature in the Elections Commission.
"Chiang Mai residents vote for change," read a headline in the English-language Bangkok Post after the election. And if Thaksin loyalists failed to win on his own turf, they may not stand much of a chance in the general elections, which the military-appointed government has promised will be held before the end of the year. Attempts by them to organise anti-coup demonstrations have not fared very well either; no more than 10,000 showed up at a weekend rally in mid-June and, according to reports in the Thai media, most of them seemed to have been paid to participate. When the weekend was over, the demonstrators returned home to their respective upcountry provinces - quite unlike the situation last year, when tens of thousands of anti-Thaksin protesters rallied almost daily in Bangkok.
However, the vote for change in Chiang Mai was not just a vote against Thaksin. The public may not support a return of Thaksin, but confidence in the present government is also eroding, of which the military is acutely aware. Opinion polls show that a record-low 13 per cent of the public approve of the present order; the vast majority wants elections to be held and a new, popular government in place. At least for now, the Democrats seem to be heading for a good showing at the polls, and their leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva, has become more of a public figure since the ban on overt political activities was lifted in late May. He is young and bright but, at 43, perhaps still a bit too young for most Thais, who are used to older politicians.
It is also possible that an independent will be leading a coalition government, which may include the Democrats. A favourite candidate right now is Purachai Piumsomboon, a former deputy prime minister who resigned in January 2005. Recent opinion polls show that 41.7 percent of respondents in Bangkok favour him because he is seen as "Mister Clean." He served under Thaksin during the first term of his premiership, and then launched a "social order" campaign against sex clubs and similar establishments. And, unlike his erstwhile mentor Thaksin, no one has accused Purachai of being corrupt.
Whatever the case, the Thaksin era in Thai politics seems to be over, and new actors are emerging on the scene. In the final analysis, the Thais seem to be tired of decades of corruption, which many feel only got worse under Thaksin's administration, and now are looking for a cleaner, more modern government that can lead the country once the military has stepped aside. But, given what happened to Thaksin on September 19 last year, it is also clear that the military is not going to become an apolitical player any time soon.
In a highly-publicised move in mid-June, he announced from his exile in London that he intended to buy Manchester City Football Club for a staggering 86.1 million British pounds. That has kept him in the public eye - at the same time as he has shown that he still has money, despite the fact that the courts have frozen more than 50 billion Baht in his Thai bank accounts. And it was money that helped him win two previous elections, 2001 and 2005, when Thai Rak Thai for the first time in Thai history that a single party secured an absolute majority in the now dissolved House of Representatives.
But it may not be that easy this time, even if Thai Rak Thai is resurrected under another name. On June 24, local mayoral elections were held in the northern city of Chiang Mai, Thaksin's hometown and long considered a Thai Rak Thai stronghold. Duentemduang na Chiang Mai, a former MP for the Democrats, which has ruled the country off and on since the end of World War II and the main opposition party when Thaksin was in power, won a landslide victory. Her arch-rival and former mayor, Boonlert Buranupakorn, and his former aid Pornchai Jittanavasathien - both considered Thaksin loyalists - were defeated, despite widespread allegations of vote-buying and attempts to block Duentemduang's candidature in the Elections Commission.
"Chiang Mai residents vote for change," read a headline in the English-language Bangkok Post after the election. And if Thaksin loyalists failed to win on his own turf, they may not stand much of a chance in the general elections, which the military-appointed government has promised will be held before the end of the year. Attempts by them to organise anti-coup demonstrations have not fared very well either; no more than 10,000 showed up at a weekend rally in mid-June and, according to reports in the Thai media, most of them seemed to have been paid to participate. When the weekend was over, the demonstrators returned home to their respective upcountry provinces - quite unlike the situation last year, when tens of thousands of anti-Thaksin protesters rallied almost daily in Bangkok.
However, the vote for change in Chiang Mai was not just a vote against Thaksin. The public may not support a return of Thaksin, but confidence in the present government is also eroding, of which the military is acutely aware. Opinion polls show that a record-low 13 per cent of the public approve of the present order; the vast majority wants elections to be held and a new, popular government in place. At least for now, the Democrats seem to be heading for a good showing at the polls, and their leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva, has become more of a public figure since the ban on overt political activities was lifted in late May. He is young and bright but, at 43, perhaps still a bit too young for most Thais, who are used to older politicians.
It is also possible that an independent will be leading a coalition government, which may include the Democrats. A favourite candidate right now is Purachai Piumsomboon, a former deputy prime minister who resigned in January 2005. Recent opinion polls show that 41.7 percent of respondents in Bangkok favour him because he is seen as "Mister Clean." He served under Thaksin during the first term of his premiership, and then launched a "social order" campaign against sex clubs and similar establishments. And, unlike his erstwhile mentor Thaksin, no one has accused Purachai of being corrupt.
Whatever the case, the Thaksin era in Thai politics seems to be over, and new actors are emerging on the scene. In the final analysis, the Thais seem to be tired of decades of corruption, which many feel only got worse under Thaksin's administration, and now are looking for a cleaner, more modern government that can lead the country once the military has stepped aside. But, given what happened to Thaksin on September 19 last year, it is also clear that the military is not going to become an apolitical player any time soon.
MYANMAR : IN THE SHADOWS OF THE THAI-BURMA BORDER: EAST ASIA'S FOREMOST REFUGEE CRISIS
Thailand is host to the largest protracted refugee situation in East Asia and until recently it appeared that the Burmese refugees would remain indefinitely 'warehoused' in camps, with little or no prospect for permanent and durable solutions to their plight. However, a new large-scale multilateral resettlement program is now gathering momentum as thousands of refugees apply for resettlement and prepare to depart for a completely new life in third countries. This is an exciting opportunity for those individuals and families selected for resettlement, putting an end to a life of indefinite limbo - the camps were first established in 1984 - but what role does resettlement play in resolving the overall Burmese predicament?
Since resettlement opened up as a possibility for residents in the border camps in 2005, more than 49,000 refugees from the nine main camps have indicated to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) their desire to resettle in a third country. This represents a significant proportion of the 143,000 mainly ethnic Karen and Karenni refugees formally registered by the UNHCR at present. The US is undertaking mass resettlement program, with an expected intake for 2007 of 20,000 refugees, mostly from the border's largest camp Mae La in Tak Province. Other host countries are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands with resettlement expected to continue for several years.
This high level of initial interest in resettlement reflects the experience of prolonged encampment in Thailand and the inability of refugees to safely return to their homelands in eastern Burma. After 23 years of limbo in Thailand, a whole new generation has grown up confined within camps and people are naturally hopeful and curious about the opportunities for life in a third country. As in other protracted refugee situations around the world, prolonged encampment produces considerable psycho-social stresses and reinforces a sense of hopelessness about future possibilities. Today a new mood of 'resettlement fever' pervades the camps, generating feelings of hope, anticipation but also concerns about separation from community and homeland. As the UNHCR reminds the Burmese refugees in its information brochure for refugees, resettlement is a 'permanent solution'.
Resettlement to a third country is one of the three internationally defined 'durable solutions' for refugees. It is often considered an option of last resort, particularly in the face of restrictive asylum policies in the West. Of the other two durable solutions, voluntary repatriation to the country of origin and local integration into the country of first asylum, repatriation is the preferred option. But for the Burmese refugees in Thailand, repatriation is not viable due to insecurity and violence continuing in eastern Burma and Thailand remains unwilling to facilitate local integration in the form of legal status and residency rights. Sometimes resettlement can play a positive role in opening up possibilities to improve local conditions for the remaining refugees, such as in areas of livelihood and education. Thailand has already indicated in-principle agreements in that direction.
Until recently - before resettlement became an option on the border - the refugees had a long-standing dream of returning home. Their leaders, including the leaders of one of the world's longest-running civil conflicts (the Karen National Union began armed struggle in 1947), do not want to give up on their struggle. The civilians displaced in this war have been caught in the midst of intractable violence and have suffered the brunt of the conflict. The event of resettlement marks a break from the long-held dream of return home.
Resettlement also presents other dilemmas, such as the short- and intermediate impacts on the remaining camp populations. Some camps are already grappling with the impact of the departure of disproportionate numbers of the most educated, skilled and experienced staff from camp services, programs and leadership. All stakeholders report concerns about the loss of these skilled staff, especially from the key sectors of health, education and camp administration, the pressure this puts on programs and the likely negative impacts on the quality of services to refugees. In several camps, for example, half of the medics are scheduled to depart for resettlement, presenting short-term problems for health programs struggling to keep up with training of replacements as well as longer-term concerns about finding sufficient staff from an already limited pool of the educated and skilled camp-based population.
Finally, whilst resettlement provides people with hope for a new life abroad it does not contribute to enduring solutions in the form of a permanent resolution of the underlying causes of displacement across in Burma's eastern borderlands, where an estimated further 500,000 people are internally displaced. Every month hundreds of new arrivals cross the Thai border seeking refuge. Thus in approaching truly sustainable solutions, we cannot isolate the refugees in the Thai border camps from the wider context continuing to cause displacement of communities.
Since resettlement opened up as a possibility for residents in the border camps in 2005, more than 49,000 refugees from the nine main camps have indicated to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) their desire to resettle in a third country. This represents a significant proportion of the 143,000 mainly ethnic Karen and Karenni refugees formally registered by the UNHCR at present. The US is undertaking mass resettlement program, with an expected intake for 2007 of 20,000 refugees, mostly from the border's largest camp Mae La in Tak Province. Other host countries are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands with resettlement expected to continue for several years.
This high level of initial interest in resettlement reflects the experience of prolonged encampment in Thailand and the inability of refugees to safely return to their homelands in eastern Burma. After 23 years of limbo in Thailand, a whole new generation has grown up confined within camps and people are naturally hopeful and curious about the opportunities for life in a third country. As in other protracted refugee situations around the world, prolonged encampment produces considerable psycho-social stresses and reinforces a sense of hopelessness about future possibilities. Today a new mood of 'resettlement fever' pervades the camps, generating feelings of hope, anticipation but also concerns about separation from community and homeland. As the UNHCR reminds the Burmese refugees in its information brochure for refugees, resettlement is a 'permanent solution'.
Resettlement to a third country is one of the three internationally defined 'durable solutions' for refugees. It is often considered an option of last resort, particularly in the face of restrictive asylum policies in the West. Of the other two durable solutions, voluntary repatriation to the country of origin and local integration into the country of first asylum, repatriation is the preferred option. But for the Burmese refugees in Thailand, repatriation is not viable due to insecurity and violence continuing in eastern Burma and Thailand remains unwilling to facilitate local integration in the form of legal status and residency rights. Sometimes resettlement can play a positive role in opening up possibilities to improve local conditions for the remaining refugees, such as in areas of livelihood and education. Thailand has already indicated in-principle agreements in that direction.
Until recently - before resettlement became an option on the border - the refugees had a long-standing dream of returning home. Their leaders, including the leaders of one of the world's longest-running civil conflicts (the Karen National Union began armed struggle in 1947), do not want to give up on their struggle. The civilians displaced in this war have been caught in the midst of intractable violence and have suffered the brunt of the conflict. The event of resettlement marks a break from the long-held dream of return home.
Resettlement also presents other dilemmas, such as the short- and intermediate impacts on the remaining camp populations. Some camps are already grappling with the impact of the departure of disproportionate numbers of the most educated, skilled and experienced staff from camp services, programs and leadership. All stakeholders report concerns about the loss of these skilled staff, especially from the key sectors of health, education and camp administration, the pressure this puts on programs and the likely negative impacts on the quality of services to refugees. In several camps, for example, half of the medics are scheduled to depart for resettlement, presenting short-term problems for health programs struggling to keep up with training of replacements as well as longer-term concerns about finding sufficient staff from an already limited pool of the educated and skilled camp-based population.
Finally, whilst resettlement provides people with hope for a new life abroad it does not contribute to enduring solutions in the form of a permanent resolution of the underlying causes of displacement across in Burma's eastern borderlands, where an estimated further 500,000 people are internally displaced. Every month hundreds of new arrivals cross the Thai border seeking refuge. Thus in approaching truly sustainable solutions, we cannot isolate the refugees in the Thai border camps from the wider context continuing to cause displacement of communities.
Tuesday, August 21, 2007
ASEAN SUMMARY
Global governance is an interesting topic to begin with. It is a sum of many ways, individuals and institutions, public as well as private to manage their common affairs. It is about cooperation as well as understanding of each actor on certain issues and how they deal with the problems. This mini research will take effort to apply global governance by relating it with newspaper article in a given times. My most concern is about ASEAN and how it contributed to the world as whole. ASEAN centred to Southeast Asian region and is functioning as an effective contributor to the maintenance of peace and stability, and the achievement of the development and prosperity of the region. Thus, ASEAN also has established relations with other countries and held many dialogue partnerships as well as other forms of cooperation including the ASEAN Plus Three process, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit. This shows how ASEAN put priority to ensure that each member and also the world will get good benefits from its establishment not for self-motives. This year ASEAN celebrated its 40th anniversary with the theme, “One Asean at the Heart of Dynamic Asia” and was held at Manila, Philippines. The main event was to see the endorsement of the final draft of the Asean Charter, sort of Asean Constitution to guide the association’s 10 member countries is accomplished. This is because without a charter, member countries cannot intervene to the others internal dispute or conflicts based on Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that has signed before. They cannot gives aid to any party eventhough the conflicts lead to suppression and has violated human rights. For example, in the case of Myanmar. The citizens are suffering caused by the autocratic ruler lead by Junta that prohibited a place for worship, no medical facilities, no free education and no freedom of speech. This is surely inhuman behavior in such a modern world. The worst thing is that, the General generate money through drug syndicates. Through a legitimate charter, this problem can be solved and the Myanmar ruler can be brought under the international law. By right, they have to obey it and this will ensure that the bloc will get attraction by other part of the world as a convenient organization. Later, at the Asean Regional Forum (ARF), it was said that ARF has condemned the killings and abduction of South Korea citizens by the Taliban in Afghanistan and called for the immediate and unconditional release of the remaining hostages. It is a global cooperation that clarified global governance does exist nowadays. Clearly, ASEAN and major superpower in agreement that non-state actor (Terrorist) should be caught and brought to the International Court of Justice for judgment for the destructions that they’ve made. It involves loss of innocent people and this remarks the war against terrorism. ARF also is a platform for all 27 members to voice out their concern on various issues and successfully produced co-operation agreements in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, export control of weapons, civil military co-ordination in disaster relief, counter terrorism and also peacekeeping.
For me, I think ASEAN should make the Charter legitimize as soon as possible and not threaten by any forces. This is to ensure that each country enjoys the same privileges and they’re binding to the rules so that no country can harm another. There must also implement free trade agreement (AFTA) in mass so that economic among the members will grow. If possible, ASEAN should have the same functions as United Nation so that ASEAN will gain more respects and countries all over the world will listen to ASEAN opinions and decisions.
As a conclusion, through many establish organs in ASEAN, it is undeniable that ASEAN is a strongest regional organization in Southeast Asia and play important key role in social, economic and politic of each members. It is respected by many world organizations because of its flexibility to compromise between each member’s even though by nature there are dispute between neighboring country such as Malaysia and Singapore and Myanmar with other Asean members. Therefore, ASEAN is aim for the ASEAN Community by 2015 to further integration and have strong sense of belonging to ASEAN.
For me, I think ASEAN should make the Charter legitimize as soon as possible and not threaten by any forces. This is to ensure that each country enjoys the same privileges and they’re binding to the rules so that no country can harm another. There must also implement free trade agreement (AFTA) in mass so that economic among the members will grow. If possible, ASEAN should have the same functions as United Nation so that ASEAN will gain more respects and countries all over the world will listen to ASEAN opinions and decisions.
As a conclusion, through many establish organs in ASEAN, it is undeniable that ASEAN is a strongest regional organization in Southeast Asia and play important key role in social, economic and politic of each members. It is respected by many world organizations because of its flexibility to compromise between each member’s even though by nature there are dispute between neighboring country such as Malaysia and Singapore and Myanmar with other Asean members. Therefore, ASEAN is aim for the ASEAN Community by 2015 to further integration and have strong sense of belonging to ASEAN.
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